Observers have suggested that Taiwan adopt this kind of “porcupine strategy” since at least 2008. 5 This analysis is based in part on interviews with current and former officials of the United States and Taiwan, and in part on publicly available information.Īdopting an asymmetric defense that would leverage Taiwan’s natural advantages and exploit the vulnerabilities of the People’s Liberation Army is not a new or novel concept. This work is part of a broader effort by the National Security Task Force at the Hoover Institution to examine the emerging Indo-Pacific security landscape. 3 Following up on a suggestion by Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow in their Council on Foreign Relations report that advanced technology could provide advantages for the defense of Taiwan, 4 we have undertaken an assessment of the potential for distributed, survivable, affordable defenses to further complicate that difficult task and make Taiwan a harder target against invasion. ![]() Implementation of a strategy that includes a large number of small things could leverage Taiwan’s geographic and technological advantages, exploit the People’s Liberation Army’s vulnerabilities, and help to deter an attempt to take the island by force.Īn airborne or amphibious invasion across the Taiwan strait would be an extraordinarily complex and difficult task. ![]() But they are unlikely to survive the initial strikes of any cross-strait invasion. Taiwan’s expensive conventional platforms are useful to counter gray-zone incursions and they have political and industrial benefits as well. Xi has also made explicit that “We make no promise to abandon the use of force, and retain the option of taking all necessary measures.” 2 The high end of the range of such measures would be an attempt to take Taiwan by force.ĭistributed, survivable, and affordable defenses could greatly complicate an attempt to invade Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army. 1 To that end, the People’s Liberation Army has upped the range and intensity of its gray-zone activities, including frequent intrusions into airspace and waters in close proximity to Taiwan. and at other locations within and outside the continental U.S., and should be finished by July 2023.įor more information contact Boeing Defense, Space & Security online at or Naval Air Systems Command at his Jspeech at Tiananmen Square to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, General Secretary Xi Jinping reiterated the party’s commitment to what it calls “reunification” with Taiwan. ![]() On this order Boeing will do the work in McKinney, Texas Sioux Falls, S.D. The Harpoon Block II, uses a 500-pound warhead for sea and land-based targets. The Harpoon missile has been in the Navy inventory since 1977. The Harpoon’s active radar guidance, low-level sea-skimming cruise trajectory, terminal mode sea-skim or pop-up maneuvers, and warhead design, assure high survivability and effectiveness, Navy officials say. HCDS consists of RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II surface-launched missiles with a maximum range of 75 miles, radar trucks, and support and test equipment. ![]() Related: Navy orders radar-guided Harpoon anti-ship missile with GPS guidance kit for in-flight navigation changes
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